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AND

v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186

On May 22, 1974, Arnold Heitner brought a shareholder's derivative suit on behalf of Greyhound, a Delaware corporation, against
twenty-eight of its past and present directors and officers. 1 The
complaint was filed in the Chancery Court of Delaware, charging the
individual defendants with a breach of their fiduciary duty to
Greyhound. 2 Heitner alleged that the breach occurred when the
defendants involved the company and its subsidiary in activities
which led to a damage judgment in an antitrust suit and a fine in a
criminal contempt action. 3 In order to compel the appearance of the
defendants, who were nonresidents of Delaware, Heitner moved to
attach their Greyhound stock under Delaware's sequestration statute,
which required the defendants to either appear and subject themselves to the court's in personam jurisdiction or forfeit their property. 4 The motion was granted and a court appointed sequestrator
1 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 189-90 (1977). The complaint also named Greyhound
Corporation and its subsidiary Greyhound Lines as defendants. Id. Both Greyhound and its
subsidiary, a California corporation, had their principal place of business in Phoenix, Arizona.
Id. at 189, 189 n.1.
2 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 189-90 (1977).
3 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 189-90 (1977). Greyhound was found liable for damages
in the sum of $13,146,090 for violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687, 688 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977). Greyhound
and Greyhound Lines were convicted of criminal contempt for failure to comply with a court
order with regard to treatment of another carrier. United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F.
Supp. 525, 573 (N.D. I11. 1973). The two companies were fined $100,000 and $500,000 respectively. United States v. Greyhound Corp., 370 F. Supp. 881, 883 (N.D. I11.), aff'd, 508 F.2d
529 (7th Cir. 1974); see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 190 nn.2 & 3 (1977).
4 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 190 & n.4 (1977). The stock was amenable to sequestration because it had statutory situs in Delaware. The applicable statute provides:
For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction of all
courts held in this State, but not for the purpose of taxation, the situs of the ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of this State,
whether organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall be regarded as in this
State.
DEL. CODE tit. 8, ' 169 (1975). The motion for sequestration was filed pursuant to title 10,
section 366 of the Delaware Code which provided for attachment of a nonresident's property
within the State, by order of the court. 433 U.S. at 190. The express purpose of the statute was
to compel a defendant's appearance at trial. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1975).
In light of this purpose, nonresidents could not enter special or limited appearances to
defend on the merits with liability limited to the value of the seized property. See Sands v.
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seized the defendants' common stock and options by placing stop5 Notice of the pending action
transfer orders on the corporate books.
6
mail.
was then issued by certified
The defendants responded by moving to quash service of process
and to set aside the sequestration order. 7 They argued that the
court's exercise of jurisdiction violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, since by compelling the defendants' submission to the court's in personam jurisdiction before allowing them to
defend on the merits, Delaware was attempting to acquire personal
jurisdiction over them without the existence of minimum contacts between the defendants and Delaware as required by International
Shoe Co. v. Washington.8 Furthermore, the appellants asserted that
Lefcourt Realty Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 340, 344-45, 117 A.2d 365, 367-68 (Sup. Ct. 1955). When
property of a nonresident was seized to compel his appearance, he either had to attack the
jurisdiction of the court or enter a general appearance to avoid condemnation of the property.
Id. at 345, 117 A.2d at 367. Thus in order to defend on the merits, the nonresident had to
submit to the personal jurisdiction of the court, thereby exposing himself to full liability on an
adverse judgment.
In most state actions involving attachment, in order to proceed judicially against a nonresident defendant, a nonresident may enter a special appearance to contest the validity of the
court's jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 39 (1942). If his attack on the court's jurisdiction fails, the court cannot render a personal judgment against him. Id. If the defendant
wishes to contest the validity of the plaintiff's claim in an action begun by attachment, he may
do so, and limit his liability to the value of the res, by stating that he does not submit himself to
the personal jurisdiction of the court. Id. § 40, Comment a. State law, however, may provide
that a defendant who enters an appearance to contest the merits of the case submits himself to
the court's jurisdiction in personam. Id.
Although this special appearance device for attacking jurisdiction was abolished in Delaware, see Schwartz v. Miner, 36 Del. Ch. 481, 483, 133 A.2d 599, 600 (Sup. Ct. 1957), a
plaintiff could still contest the validity of the court's jurisdiction under the sequestration statute
by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as provided by DEL. CH. CT. CIv. P.R.
12(b). If his motion was denied, he did not submit himself to the court's jurisdiction, unless he
elected to defend on the merits. Schwartz v. Miner, 36 Del. Ch. 481, 483, 133 A.2d 599, 600
(Sup. Ct. 1957). For a further discussion of Delaware's sequestration statute, see Folk & Moyer,
Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 COLUM

. LREV. 749, 749-56 (1973).

In any event, the sequestration statute permitted release of the property after a general
appearance was entered, unless it appeared that continued seizure was necessary to guarantee
the satisfaction of a judgment against the defendant. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1975).
1 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1977). Sequestration was carried out by a
"sequestrator" who filed a list of the sequestrated property with the court. Id. at 191-92 n.6.
Some 82,000 shares of Greyhound common stock, with an approximate value of $1.2 million,
were seized along with options, warrants, debentures and stock unit credits. Id. at 191-92, 192'
nn.7 & 8.
' Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 192 (1977). The sequestration statute provided for
notice by mail and publication. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1975). In accordance with the statute,
notification was given by mail and also by publication in a newspaper where the suit was
brought. 433 U.S. at 192.
' Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1977).
" Appellants' Brief on the Merits at 85-86 app. A, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)
(Letter Opinion of Judge Brown, Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware) [hereinafter cited
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Delaware's prejudgment sequestration proceeding deprived them of
their property without providing due process guarantees of notice and
an opportunity for a prior hearing. 9
The Delaware court of chancery dismissed the defendants' contentions, holding that the proceeding, at least when commenced
under the sequestration statute, was quasi in rem and therefore properly supported by the statutory presence of their stock in Delaware.1 0 The chancery court further held that, in light of the temporary nature of the seizure and its purpose, ex parte attachment
under the statute provided sufficient procedural safeguards to meet
the demands of due process."
The validity of the sequestration statas Letter Opinion]; see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Speaking for
the majority in International Shoe, Chief Justice Stone said that
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts-with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
9 Letter Opinion, supra note 8, at 79 app. A. On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, the defendants argued that recent Supreme Court decisions had confirmed "that a seizure of property without notice or hearing is unconstitutional except in extraordinary situations
and unless there are sufficient other safeguards to satisfy due process." Appellants' Brief on the
Merits at 7, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
In Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), the Court struck down a prejudgment garnishment procedure as violative of the due process clause. Id. at 342. The Court stated
that due process of law affords one the opportunity to attack the propriety of a claim prior to a
deprivation of property. See id. at 339-40. Similarly, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972),
the Court found that prejudgment replevin writs issued by Florida and Pennsylvania constituted
a deprivation of property without due process of law. Id. at 84-86.
The Court retreated somewhat from this position in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974), when it held that seizure of personal goods under a writ of sequestration did not
deny due process of law, where the procedure provides the debtor with adequate safeguards.
Id. at 601-03, 618-19. Justice White emphasized that the sequestration statute in Mitchell did
not work a final deprivation of private property, id. at 606-, and that the statute was "a constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties." Id. at 607.
In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), the Court returned to its Sniadach-Fuentes stance, holding that garnishment of the petitioner's bank account
was unconstitutional since it amounted to seizure and deprivation of property "without notice
and without opportunity for a hearing or other safeguard against mistaken repossession." Id. at
606. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Powell read due process in attachment proceedings
as requiring: (1) the submission of affidavits, stating the reasons for the writ to a "neutral officer"; (2) the posting of a bond by the plaintiff, and (3) the opportunity for an immediate
"judicial hearing" following garnishment. Id. at 611.
10 Letter Opinion, supra note 8, at 85-86 app. A. For a discussion of quasi in rem jurisdiction, see note 38 infra and accompanying text.
"1 Letter Opinion, supra 8, at 80 app. A. The Delaware Court of Chancery found that the
due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard, established by the Sniadach
line of cases, see note 9 supra, were met in light of the purpose of the statute (i.e., to compel
the defendant's appearance at trial rather than permit the seizure of his property pending the
resolution of the plaintiff's claim to it) and in light of the fact that the owner could petition for
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ute was upheld by the Delaware supreme court,' 2 which noted that
the minimum contacts test relied upon by the defendants was inapplicable where quasi in rem jurisdiction13 was based upon the presence of property within the forum state.
it
On appeal, the Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner '4 found 15
necessary to address only the appellants' jurisdictional argument.
Striking down Delaware's sequestration procedure as unconstitutional, the Court ruled that due process demands that the exercise of
in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction, based solely on the presence of a
nonresident's property within the state, must satisfy the same
minimum contacts test as required by International Shoe for the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction. 16 Fictional situs 'of property,
therefore, may not be used to acquire jurisdiction over a defendant
who has no minimum contacts with the forum state. Although the
presence of property in certain instances may bear upon the question
of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the parties, the forum,
and the controversy, property alone may not provide the basis for
17
jurisdiction where it is wholly unrelated to the cause of action.
When such is the case, as with Shaffer, a court must determine
whether the presence of property indicates the existence of other
contacts that would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair and reasonable. 1 8 The Court reasoned that quasi in rem jurisdiction affects a
defendant personally by depriving him of his rights in the res and,
therefore, should be subject to the same standard governing personal
the prompt release of his property once he entered a general appearance. Letter Opinion,
supra note 8, at 75-76, 80-81, 83-84 app. A; see DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1975). The purpose
of the statute and the limitation on the time for which the property was seized also served to
distinguish the Sniadach line of cases in that they did not involve an attachment proceeding
which was aimed at compelling personal appearance. Letter Opinion, supra at 75-76, 80-81,
83-84 app. A.
12 Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 227 (Del. 1976), rev'd, Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977). In upholding the procedural aspect of the sequestration statute, the chancery court noted that the prejudgment attachment procedure was necessary to assure jurisdiction over nonresidents. Characterizing the attachment as an "extraordinary situation" which was
necessary to secure jurisdiction, the court declared that in light of the competing interests of the
plaintiff and defendant, the statute provided sufficient procedural safeguards to satisfy constitutional requirements. 361 A.2d at 231, 235.
13 Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d at 229. For a discussion of the court's source of
power in a quasi in rem proceeding, see note 34 ifra.
14 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
15 Id. at 189.
16 See id. at 213-17. As to whether the Shaffer Court found Delaware's sequestration stat-

ute itself unconstitutional or merely the exercise of jurisdiction under the statute in cases where
minimum contacts between defendant and forum are absent, see Grynberg v. Burke, 388 A.2d
443, 445 (Del. Ch. 1978).
17 433 U.S. at 207-08.
58

See id. at 207-09.

1978]

NOTES

jurisdiction. 19 Finding the statutory presence of the appellants' stock
to be the sole nexus between Delaware and the appellant shareholders, 2 0 the Court held that Delaware's assertion of adjudicatory
power over the nonresidents violated due process of law, since the
nonresidents lacked sufficient minimum contacts, relations, or ties
with Delaware to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. 2 '
Due process was first used to restrict state court jurisdiction in
Pennoyer v. Neff, 22 where an Oregon court attempted to use its
jurisdiction over property within its borders to exercise in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident who owned such property. 2 3 The
19 Id. at 207-08, 212. For a line of cases developing InternationalShoe's minimum contacts
doctrine, see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (contact between defendant and
forum must consist of bilateral activity whereby "the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State"); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) (isolated insurance contract with resident of forum provided sufficient contact to sustain jurisdiction over nonresident insurance company in action arising out of
"contract which had substantial connection with" forum); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952) (jurisdiction to enforce liabilities which arose out of activities
outside forum upheld where foreign national carried on systematic and continuous business
within forum); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 645-49 (1950) (focusing on
forum's strong regulatory interest, Court upheld jurisdiction over nonresident corporation which
conducted mail-order insurance business within forum state); Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d
143, 149-50, 545 P.2d 264, 267-68, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355-56 (1976) (an indirect nexus is
sufficient to uphold jurisdiction where a tort arises out of a chain of events connected with the
forum, even though the tort occurred outside the forum); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 438, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 764, 766 (1961) (production of
defective safety valve, placed in stream of commerce outside the forum, but "in contemplation
of use" in the forum constituted minimum contacts). For a discussion of New Jersey cases
construing the minimum contacts doctrine, see note 134 infra.
20 433 U.S. at 213. The Court noted that the Delaware statute was directed at nonresident
property owners in general, and did not assert a state interest in compelling the appearance at
trial of nonresident fiduciaries of a Delaware corporation. Id.; see DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366
(1975). Thus, the Court concluded that, in this case, the Delaware court grounded its adjudicatory power "solely on the statutory presence of [the defendant's] property in Delaware." 433
U.S. at 213.
21 433 U.S. at 216-17.
22 95 U.S. 714 (1877).

23 Id. at 718-20, 733. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment had been
newly enacted when the Pennoyer Court made reference to it. See Hazard, A General Theory
of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241, 263. This reference made "due process
the primary consideration in jurisdictional inquiries." Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem
Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 300, 305 (1970).
Prior to Pennoyer, courts analyzed extraterritorial extensions of state adjudicatory power
under the principles of the full faith and credit clause. See D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11
How.) 165, 174-76 (1850). Under a full faith and credit approach, the question involved was
whether the federal government should lend its power "to assist the extraterritorial enforcement
of a state's judicial decrees." Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L.
REv. 569, 585 (1957). Quite significantly, however, the Court in Pennoyer "identified the test
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause with the test under the Due Process Clause, making a
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case involved an action in ejectment to recover possession of real
property in Oregon.2 4 The property had been sold to Pennoyer to
enforce a personal judgment against the nonresident owner. 25 In his
suit for ejectment, the owner, Neff, attacked the validity of this
judgment. 2 6 Alleging that he had not been served with process
within Oregon and that the property had not been attached prior to
commencement of the suit, Neff contended that the court lacked
jurisdiction, since neither he nor his property had been brought
under the control of the court. 2 7 On appeal to the Supreme Court,
the judgment against the nonresident Neff was deemed unsupportable under the lower court's in personam jurisdiction, since such
power was limited by the boundaries of the state. 28 Moreover, failure to attach the property at the beginning of the suit was found to
preclude the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction as a proper basis for
rendering a valid judgment. 29 Interpreting the newly enacted due
process clause to mean that a judgment is valid within a forum only
when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court concluded that the judgment was without force inside as well
30
as outside the forum.
Pennoyer's significance, however, lies not in its holding but in
the Court's application of what were then the current principles of
jurisdictional law governing independent states. Grounded upon the
mutually exclusive sovereignty of the states, these principles prevailed as the basis for adjudicatory power for nearly a century. 3 The
first principle stated "that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory." 32
judgment which would not be enforceable beyond the borders of the state unenforceable within
its boundaries." Id.; see Comment, supra at 305.

24 95 U.S. at 719.
25 Id. at 719-21. Pennoyer allegedly "acquired the premises under a sheriff's deed, made
upon a sale of the property on execution issued upon a judgment recovered against" Neff by an
attorney for unpaid legal services. Id. at 719.
26 Id. at 721-22.
27 Id. at 720, 727; see id. at 733-34.

28 Id. at 720, 727, 733. Neff had received "constructive service of summons by publication,"
id. at 720, through a newspaper circulated in the county where the suit was commenced. See
id. at 717-18.
29 See id. at 733-34. For a discussion of quasi in rem jurisdiction, see notes 35-40 infra and

accompanying text.
30 95 U.S. at 733-34; see id. at 722.

31 See id. at 722-26. See generally J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§ 19, 20, 21 (3d ed. 1846). The concepts of in rem and in personam jurisdiction were established well before Pennoyer. See, e.g., Kibbe v. Kibbe, I Kirby 119, 125-26 (Conn. 1786);
Phelps v. Holker, 1 Pa. (Dall.) 261, 264 (1788); Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121, 140-43 (N.Y.
1818).
32 95 U.S. at 722.
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Following from this, the second principle was "that no State can
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property"
outside its territorial boundaries. 3 3 Thus, service of process beyond
the territorial boundaries of the state was ineffectual. Unless the individual voluntarily consented to jurisdiction, a state's power to adjudicate a claim against him depended upon whether that state could
34
exercise physical power over him or his property.
A categorical approach to jurisdiction, classifying actions as either
in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem developed from these two
"principles of public law."35 If the defendant were present
within
the state and brought under the control of the court by service of
process, the court could then adjudicate his personal liability by proceeding in personam. 3 6 On the other hand, if the court sought to
33 Id.
34 Id. at 733 see 1 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90.1 (1935); H.
GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73, at 189 (3d ed. 1949).
Professor Ehrenzweig has stated that there was no need for the Pennoyer Court to enunciate these broad territorial principles that long have plagued jurisdictional law. Ehrenzweig,
Pennoyer Is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 285, 286 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as Pennoyer Is Dead]. He further opined that "physical power fails completely as a
rationale" for supporting jurisdiction. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction:
The "'Power"Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 310 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
Transient Rule]. The perpetuation of this "powermyth" conception of adjudicatory jurisdiction,
grounded upon territorial sovereignty, was the source of unending problems in the resolution of
jurisdictional disputes. Pennoyer Is Dead, supra at 286. According to Professor Ehrenzweig,
principles of territorial sovereignty gave rise to what he termed the "transient rule," i.e., that
personal jurisdiction could be obtained "by mere physical service of process, even in a forum
where neither plaintiff nor defendant resides and which has no connection with the cause of
action." Transient Rule, supra at 289. Cf. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (person
domiciled in state, although absent, subject to that state court's in personam jurisdiction); Grace
v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 444 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (in personam jurisdiction acquired by
service of process upon defendant while in an airplane flying over the state in which the action
was brought).
35 95 U.S. at 722. The Supreme Court has differentiated among the jurisdictional classifications by stating that
[a] judgment in personam imposes a personal liability or obligation on one person in
favor of another. A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated
property. A judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of particular persons in
designated property, The latter is of two types. In one the plaintiff is seeking to
secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property and to extinguish or establish the
nonexistence of similar interests of particular persons. In the other the plaintiff
seeks to apply what he concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958).
The classification of jurisdiction as in rem or in personam has been criticized as a "logical
impossibility," because any action against a res affects personal rights to the extent that they are

related to the res. Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction:Outmoded and Unconstitutional?,49 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 668, 670 (1975). See also note 38 infra.

36 See 95 U.S. at 725-27: 1 J. BEALE, supra note 34, § 78.1; H. GOODRICH, supra note 34,
73, at 109. Two requirements for the proper exercise of jurisdiction are power over the person
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adjudicate a claim in property within its borders, it could render a
judgment valid against all the world by seizing the property and proceeding in rem. 37 Seizure of the res also provided the means for
adjudicating personal claims against particular nonresidents who
owned property within the state. 3 8 When the court attached property for this purpose it proceeded quasi in rem. But unlike a personal
judgment, a quasi in rem decree was limited to the value of the attached property and could not bind the defendant personally. 3 9 As
the Pennoyer Court emphasized, attachment had to take place ait
the
commencement of a quasi in rem proceeding in order to provide the
owner with notice and assure the court of a basis for jurisdiction
40
throughout the proceeding.
The principles enunciated in Pennoyer laid a concrete basis for
determining due process of law with regard to state court jurisdiction.
The person or res within the territorial boundaries of the state
was subject to that state's sovereign power and the concurrent jurisdiction of its courts. The scope of this sovereign power was therefore
defined by the territorial boundaries of the state. It was this limiting
aspect which made these principles useful and convenient in rendering an abstract concept of due process concrete. Above all, the concept of territoriality served as a limitation on state adjudicatory power
and a guarantee of the integrity of independent states in a nineor res and reasonable notice so as to provide the defendant with an opportunity to be heard. 70
HARV. L. REV. 1257, 1257 (1957).

37 95 U.S. at 722-28.
38 Id. at 725-28.
The term quasi in rem applies to actions which cannot be narrowly defined as in rem since
they are directed against persons. See Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 187-88 (1886).
Traditionally, a judgment quasi in rem had been limited to the value of the attached res, since
the court was not proceeding against the person, but was theoretically proceeding against the
res. See 1 J. BEALE, supra note 34, § 74.5; H. GOODRICH, supra note 34, § 71, at 176-77. See

also Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76-77, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (1900) (in an in rem
action property is nominal defendant). In reality, however, quasi in rem jurisdiction provided an
alternative means for affecting the interest of a nonresident defendant, at least to the extent of
his interest in the res. See Shaffer v, Heitner, 433 U.S. at 207; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56, introductory note at 190 (1971). As noted in the Restatement, "every

valid exercise of judicial jurisdiction affects the interests of persons." Id.
39 95 U.S. at 726.
10 See id. at 720, 725-28. The rule that property must be attached, ie., brought under
control of the court, before an in rem judgment could be rendered, seemed "wholly novel" at
the time. Hazard, supra note 23, at 269. Service by publication and seizure of the res were
originally accepted as sufficient to provide the owner with notice of the pending suit. 95 U.S. at
727; see Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 272 (1917). The Court, however, later
came to require a means of notification "reasonably certain to inform those affected." See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950); Schroeder v. City of
New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211-13 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115-16
(1956).
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teenth-century federal system. 4 1 Accordingly, the propriety of all assertions of jurisdiction turned on a question of presence.42
With the passage of time, increased travel and commerce between the states gave rise to a greater number of legal actions involving nonresident defendants. In light of the Pennoyer rule, this
situation tended to favor nonresident defendants by making it more
difficult to acquire jurisdiction over them.43 In an apparent attempt
to reduce this imbalance, the Court developed several rationales
which allowed certain extraterritorial extensions of jurisdiction while
preserving the basic limitations espoused in Pennoyer.4 4 One
method, which allowed for the extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction, called for the application of quasi in rem concepts to intangible
property. Of course, the recognition of intangible property as an
attachable res required the Court to assign it fictional situs. Such was
the case in Harris v. Balk, 45 where a Maryland resident had a claim
against Balk, a resident of North Carolina. 46 In order to proceed on
his claim he attached a debt, owed to Balk by Harris, while Harris
was visiting Maryland. 47 Harris paid the debt after notifying Balk,
who did not appear. 48 When Balk later sued Harris to recover the
debt, the attachment and the Maryland judgment were ruled invalid
by the North Carolina supreme court which held that the situs of the
debt was in North Carolina, the debtor's place of domicile. 49
The Supreme Court, however, upheld the validity of the Maryland judgment by ruling that a debt follows the debtor and may be
attached wherever he is found. 50 Deciding that jurisdiction over the
debtor had been obtained by service of process, the Court reasoned
that the intangible debt was attached by acquiring personal jurisdic"1 95 U.S. at 733; see Zammit, supra note 35, at 668. See generally Hazard, supra note 23,
at 262.
412See generally Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer

v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 600, 600-02 (1977); Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123,
1132 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring).
43 Quasi in rem provided some relief from a strict territorial concept of jurisdiction by allowing extraterritorial jurisdiction through attachment. See Zammit, supra note 35, at 670.
44 See Kurland, supra note 23, at 577-86; Smit, supra note 42, at 602-03.
45 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
41 Id. at 216. Previous efforts to assign situs to a debt were limited to either the domicile of
the debtor or creditor. See Beale, The Exercise of JurisdictionIn Rem to Compel Payment of a
Debt, 27 HARv. L. REV. 107, 114-15 (1913). But the more acceptable "doctrine would seem to
be that a debt has in fact no situs anywhere; not merely because it is intangible but because as a
mere forced relation between the parties it has no real existence anywhere." Id. at 115.
47 198 U.S. at 216.
48

Id. at 216-17.

19 Id. at 217. For a discussion on assignment of situs, see note 46 supra.
50 198 U.S. at 222-23.
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tion over the debtor-garnishee and that the plaintiff had then proceeded as the representative of the nonresident creditor. 51 As a consequence of Harris, state courts were given constitutional authority to
adjudicate any claim against nonresidents who owned property in the
forum, regardless of whether they were present or had contacts with
the state, or whether the claim was related to the res. The judgment
52
rendered was limited only by the value of the res.
While the attachment of intangible property permitted greater
use of quasi in rem power, a similar expansion of in personam jurisdiction was accomplished through the use of several fictional devices. 5 3 One device, the implied consent doctrine, rested upon the
theory that a state could condition entry by nonresidents upon their
consent to jurisdiction in the event of a suit against them. 54 Perhaps
the most acceptable use of this theory was in support of nonresident
motorist statutes. In the case of Hess v. Pawloski, 55 such a statute
conditioned the use of state public highways by nonresidents upon
their consent to the appointment of a state official as their agent for
56
receipt of process in actions resulting from automobile accidents.
Despite arguments to the contrary, the Court accepted the proposition that a state had the power to exclude nonresident motorists from
51 Id. at 223-24, 226. Professor Beale proposed that "the court quite ignored the nature of
the proceeding as quasi in rem, and held that a garnishee could be held in any jurisdiction
where he may be served with process." Beale, supra note 46, at 119. This "conception of
garnishment as a transitory personal action against the garnishee," has displaced the original
view that garnishment was supported by the state's power over the res. Id. at 118; see Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 550, 563 (1967).

52 See 198 U.S. at 221, 223. On this point Professor Zammit has commented that when
there are insufficient contacts with the forum state to sustain jurisdiction in personam, it would
be unfair to subject a nonresident defendant to quasi in rem jurisdiction merely because he has
property within the state. Zammit, supra note 35, at 676. For a discussion of this idea, see
Camire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H. 281, 282-83, 358 A.2d 397, 399 (1976) (fictional situs of insurance
policy as basis for jurisdiction rejected in favor of broad principles of jurisdiction over persons
and property).
53 For a discussion of the use of fictional devices to assert jurisdiction over nonresident
corporations, see Kurland, supra note 23, at 577-86. See generally Transient Rule, supra note
34; von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1121, 1149 (1966); Zammit, supra note 35, at 672.
54 For a discussion of the consent doctrine, see Kurland, supra note 23, at 578-82.
55 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
56 Id. at 354, 356-57. Service of process was carried out pursuant to chapter 90 of the
General Laws of Massachusetts, as amended by the passage of a 1923 statute, which provides
that
[t]he acceptance by a non-resident of the rights and privileges conferred by section
three or four, as evidenced by his operating a motor vehicle . .. on a public way
.. .shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment . .. of the registrar . .. to be
his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process.
1923 Mass. Acts ch. 431, § 2.
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its highways until they gave such consent. From this the Court readily concluded that the use of state highways constituted an implied
consent. 5 7 The Court justified the use of this fiction by citing the
dangers inherent in the operation of the automobile and the state's
58
interest in maintaining safe highways.
A second device, the presence doctrine, provided still another
way to extend in personam jurisdiction. This theory, as stated in cases
such as InternationalHarvester Co. v. Kentucky, 59 allowed courts to
define corporate presence in terms of the business activity carried on
in the forum by foreign corporations. 60 The deciding question in
International Harvester was whether the extent and manner of the
business carried on in the forum warranted the inference that the
corporation was present to receive service of process. 6 1 This rationale allowed for the exercise of jurisdiction over companies engaged

51 See 274 U.S. at 356. The Court found that the statute did not violate the privileges and
immunities clause of the Constitution, since it did not discriminate against nonresidents, but
only made them amenable to process for torts committed in the state. See id. at 355-56. Actual
consent had already been recognized as constitutional when, in Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S.
160 (1916), the Court upheld a New Jersey statute which required nonresident motorists, as a
condition to their use of its highways, to file a formal instrument appointing the Secretary of
State as their personal representative for service of process in any legal action arising out of the
operation of an automobile. Id. at 164, 166-69. The Hess Court stated, however, that any
"difference between the formal and implied appointment [of an agent] is not substantial so far as
concerns the application of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 274 U.S. at
357.
51 274 U.S. at 356. While discussing the basis for nonresident motorists statutes, the Court,
in Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953), remarked that "[in point of fact,
however, jurisdiction in these cases does not rest on consent at all," rather "liability rests on the
inroad which the automobile has made on the decision ofPennoyer." Id. at 341. Cf. Doherty &
Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 625, 627-28 (1935) (under an implied consent statute, Court
upheld jurisdiction over a foreign company by emphasizing the forum's "exceptional" interest in
regulating corporate securities).
Because the doctrine was premised on the state's right to exclude, the state's inability to
exclude interstate commerce undermined the implied consent doctrine as applied to foreign
corporations. See Kurland, supra note 23, at 581-82. Cf. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348
U.S. 61, 63-65 (1954) (a state cannot exclude interstate motor carriers from its public highways,
since Interstate Commerce Commission has exclusive power to revoke licenses for interstate
travel); Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289, 293 (1919) (implied consent rationale not applied to
partnership, since state cannot exclude natural persons); Tardiff v. Bank Line, 127 F. Supp.
945, 946, 948 (E.D. La. 1954) (implied consent, as condition to use of state's navigable waters,
rejected as state interference with interstate commerce). See generally Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 766-68 (1945); Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 96 U.S. 1, 13 (1877).
59 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
" Id. at 589. This approach allowed courts to look beyond the evidence of mere physical
presence in determining whether a foreign corporation was subject to their jurisdiction. See id.
at 582-86; Kurland, supra note 23, at 582-84.
61 234 U.S. at 583.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:47

solely in interstate commerce. 62 Both the consent theory, as applied
to corporations, and the presence theory turned on whether the business carried on in the forum warranted an inference of implied consent or presence. 63 Consequently, a third theory, the "doing business" doctrine evolved. 64 Under this approach, courts looked to the
quantity and quality of activity which might amount to "doing busi65
ness" within the forum state.
The need to formulate these theories in order to extend in personam jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of the state manifested the
impracticability of strict territorial limitations on jurisdiction. The
principles of public law espoused by Pennoyer equated adjudicatory
jurisdiction with territorial sovereignty and did not recognize the
validity of extraterritorial applications of state law. While these principles may have been applicable to independent sovereigns, they became less practicable given the economic and political realities of a
growing federal system. 66 Once in personam jurisdiction was recognized outside the state, it was no longer dependent upon the physical
power attendant upon territorial sovereignty. The question then to be
answered was when should a national sovereign lend its power to the
enforcement of judgments by state courts against nonresidents, that
is, when would an extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction comply with
the requirements of due process. 6 7 Pennoyer could provide little
help in resolving this issue because it did not recognize the legitimacy of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Judicial rationales based on fictional devices were likewise of little help, for they failed to provide a
68
fixed standard.
62 See id. at 587-89.

'3 See Kurland, supra note 23, at 584.
64 See 234 U.S. at 583; Kurland, supra note 23, at 584-86; Developments in the LawState-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 922-23 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
65 See 234 U.S. at 582-86; Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 922-23; Kurland,

supra note 23, at 584-85. As Professor Kurland points out, "law reports became cluttered with
decisions as to what constituted 'doing business'," and some of these "cases drew fine lines
which made little sense in terms of either theory." Id. at 584; see Hutchinson v. Chase &
Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1930). See generally Reynolds v. Missouri, Kan. & Tex.
Ry., 224 Mass. 379, 385-86, 113 N.E. 413, 415 (1916), aff'd on other grounds, 228 Mass. 584,
117 N.E. 913 (1917), aff'd per curiam, 255 U.S. 565 (1921) (to determine presence, the state
court considered defendant's business activities collectively, viz., advertising, correspondence,
solicitation and collection of monies); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 228 (1913)
(company is carrying on business to the extent that renders it amenable to service of process
when it has an agent in the forum to settle claims against it).
8 See Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1129-30 (3d Cir. 1976).
67 See Kurland, supra note 23, at 586-87.
68 See id. at 585.
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It was not until 1945, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,6 9
that the Court adopted a new constitutional limit on the exercise of in
personam power. 70 In that case, International Shoe refused to pay
an unemployment tax in the state of Washington on commissions received by salesmen in that state, arguing that it was not doing business within the state in such a continuous and systematic manner as
would make it present within the state. 71 The Supreme Court rejected the "doing business" and "presence" formulations, holding that
the requirements of due process "may be met by such contacts of the
corporation with the State of the forum as make it reasonable, in the
context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there." 72 Engaging in what may be termed a quid pro quo rationale, the Court
reasoned that since a corporation enjoys "benefits and protection"
from the laws of the state where it carries on its activities, it is only
fair and reasonable that in return it must answer certain suits brought
in the state to enforce obligations there. 7 3 Although the claim
brought against International Shoe arose out of the company's activities within the state, the Court noted that an act or acts may be of
such quality and so substantial as to warrant jurisdiction, even though
the activity is unrelated to the suit or the contact amounts to a single
act. 74 Given this broad standard, due process came to require "that
in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be
not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 75
This standard was broad enough to countenance the consideration of
such factors as the interests and convenience of the parties and the
state. 76

69

326 U.S. 310 (1945).

70 The Court could have rendered the same judgment by employing the InternationalHar-

vester rule, since the relevant facts of both cases were similar. Compare International Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. at 584-87 with International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at
313-15.
71 326 U.S. at 320.
72 Id. at 317.
73 Id. at 319.
74

id.

'5 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see Smyth v. Twin
State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 575, 80 A.2d 664, 668 (1951)(International Shoe described as part of "a trend [away] from the court with immediate power over the defendant to
the court where both parties may most conveniently settle their dispute").
76 F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 640-41 (1965); see Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV. 657, 662--63 (1959).
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Although the "minimum contacts" test was subsequently limited
to in personam jurisdiction," 7 some courts recognized that the due
process standard set forth in International Shoe might equally apply
to the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 78 In the case of Seider v.
Roth, 79 the plaintiff, a resident of New York, sought to attach the
contractual obligations of an insurer doing business in the forum in
order to adjudicate the liability of a nonresident policyholder in connection with an automobile accident which occurred outside the
state. 80 Under the terms of the insurance contract, the insurer,
which the court looked upon as a resident, was to be in full control of
the litigation.81 In a four to three decision, the Court of Appeals of
New York held that the insurer's contractual obligation to defend and
indemnify the defendant policyholder was a res subject to attachient, and furnished a sufficient basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction
under New York law. 82
Although the court's decision was based on a quasi in rem
rationale, the outcome was influenced by the concept of fairness with
17 See 326 U.S. at 316.
78 See, e.g., Atkinson v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957); Seider v. Roth,
17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
One commentator has posited that because of the development of personal jurisdiction
through the minimum contacts theory, "the quasi in rem procedure is rarely useful to plaintiffs
except in cases which the defendant ought not to be asked to defend in the forum chosen by the
plaintiff." Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARv. L. REv'. 303,
305-06 (1962); see Smit, supra note 42, at 600-01. Professor Zammit theorized that concern
over the defendant's relation to the state in the exercise of in personam jurisdiction, "as well as
heightened concern over the requirements of procedural due process, . . . rendered the entire
concept of jurisdictional attachment constitutionally suspect." Zammit, supra note 35, at 672.
79 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
80 Id. at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
"1 Id. at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
82 Id. at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102. The majority read the insurance
agreement to require the insurer "to defend Lemiux [the insured] in any automobile negligence
action and, if judgment be rendered against Lemiux, to indemnify him therefor." Id. at 113,
216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101. Furthermore, the court found that the policy required
the insurer "upon receipt of notice of loss or damage to investigate and if expedient to negotiate
or settle with the claimant ....
[and] to pay necessary medical and similar expenses." Id. In his
dissent, Judge Burke characterized the majority's opinion as an example of bootstrapping in that
"[tihe existence of the policy is used as a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to start the very action
necessary to activate the insurer's obligation under the policy." Id. at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315,
269 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
The effect of the Seider holding was to judicially create a "direct action" against the insurer. Id. at 114-15, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102. For a discussion of the judicial
creation of direct actions, see Comment, supra note 51, at 558-60.
In a later case, the Court of Appeals of New York limited the insurer's liability in a Seider
situation to the face amount of the insurance policy, i.e., the amount of the attached debt.
Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 310, 234 N.E.2d 669, 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636-37
(1967). The Seider rule was upheld in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), aff'd
on rehearing, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
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respect to the relative situations of the parties involved. As the court
of appeals pointed out when it reaffirmed Seider in another insurance
case, Simpson v. Loehmann, 8 3 the insurer's presence in the forum, its
control of the litigation, and the state's interest in providing its residents with a forum formed a sufficient nexus between the state and
84
the controversy to support a fair exercise of jurisdiction in Seider.
Another application of the fairness standard to quasi in rem
jurisdiction occurred in California when, in Atkinson v. Superior
Courtj 5 members of the Federation of Musicians sought to serve
process upon a New York trustee who was an indispensible party in a
suit to prevent contributions by their employers to a trust established
by the Federation. 8 6 The Supreme Court of California found that
the employer's obligation to contribute to the trust constituted personal property within the state under California law, 8 7 but it declined
83 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
84Id. at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637. In evaluating the insurer's role, the
Simpson court remarked that "it selects the defendant's attorneys; it decides if and when to
settle: and it makes all procedural decisions in connection with the litigation." Id.; see 17
N.Y.2d at 313, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101. Furthermore, one commentator has
observed that those "cases that have construed the Seider doctrine, whether by requiring some
connection between the forum and the underlying controversy or by analogizing to direct-action
statutes, implicitly recognize that the due process limitations of International Shoe apply to such
quasi in rem proceedifigs." Comment, supra note 23, at 337 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Zammit remarked that a state's interest in providing its citizens with a forum was
"at the heart of the result in Seider v. Roth." Zammit, supra note 35, at 681. In fact, the Seider
procedure was later deemed to be valid only when invoked by a resident of the forum state.
Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 228, 230-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d
812, 817 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969).
" 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
6 Id. at 340-41, 316 P.2d at 961-62. The trust was established between plaintiffs' union and
their employers to fund performances by musicians given to the public without charge, in order
"to contribute to the public knowledge and appreciation of music." Id. at 340, 316 P.2d at 962.
The plaintiffs alleged "that the trust arrangement divert[ed] [their] wages .. . without corresponding benefit to plaintiffs." Id. at 341, 316 P.2d at 962.
87 Id. at 342, 348, 316 P.2d at 963, 966. In fact, the court was attaching the very claim
which plaintiffs sought to litigate. On this point the court said:
We find no relevance in the distinction defendants seek to make between
jurisdiction to take over a nonresident's claim to a chose in action admittedly his
and jurisdiction to establish that it was never his. In both situations the nonresident
can protect his interest in the property only by submitting to the jurisdiction of the
court. . . . [T]his distinction alone has no bearing on the fairness of making him
appear.
Id. at 346, 316 P.2d at 965.
Discussing the case two years later, Justice Traynor wrote:
[Tihe court felt compelled to find a quasi-in-rem basis for jurisdiction, even though
there were enough contacts with the state to justify full in personam jurisdiction
over the nonresident defendant, because a statute authorized a personal judgment
only if the defendant was a resident at the time of suit.
Traynor, supra note 76, at 662.
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to justify the constitutionality of its jurisdiction upon quasi in rem
concepts. 8 8 Instead, the court drew upon the "general principles
governing jurisdiction," declaring that considerations of fundamental
fairness were not limited to personal jurisdiction.8 9 In concluding
that a sufficient nexus existed between the trustee and the forum to
warrant jurisdiction, the court pointed out that the employers were
already before the court, that the employer's liability and the contested payments stemmed from the plaintiffs' employment in the
forum, and that the conflicting claims to the res by the trustee and
the plaintiffs should, in fairness to the parties involved, be litigated
before the same court.90
The principles enunciated in Pennoyer were again re-examined
by the Supreme Court when, in Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court addressed the issue of whether the minimum contacts standard of due
process used for in personam jurisdiction in International Shoe was
applicable to the exercise of in rem and quasi in rem power. 9 '
Speaking for the Court, Justice Marshall traced the history of territorial jurisdiction based on the "century-old case of Pennoyer v.
Neff" 92 and found it inapplicable to a modern federal system of government. 9 3 More importantly, he declared that a proceeding against
s 49 Cal.2d at 345, 316 P.2d at 964.
In explaining the court's decision not to rely on the assignment of fictional situs, Justice
Traynor stated:
It seemed as irrational to resolve the problem by assigning a fictional situs to intangibles as it would to pin a tail blindfolded to a non-existent donkey. Instead it was
identified as a problem of jurisdiction over persons and property. It was resolved in
terms of the interacting elements of the parties' contacts with the forum state, the
interests of the states concerned in the outcome, and the pervading concept of fair
play to all parties.
Traynor, supra note 76, at 662.
" 49 Cal.2d at 345, 316 P.2d at 964.
90 Id. at 347-48, 316 P.2d at 966. In further support of its decision, the court noted that the
defendant obligors, who were before the court, were also subject to "the conflicting claims of
the trustee." Id. at 347, 316 P.2d at 966. The failure to acquire jurisdiction over the trustee
would not have precluded the plaintiffs from proceeding against the defendant obligors. Id. See
generally New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916). Such a situation would have
created the risk of double liability for the obligor. Citing federal interpleader legislation as a
remedial measure to the problem of double liability in such situations, the court posited that it
was "doubtful whether today the United States Supreme Court would deny to a state court the
interstate interpleader jurisdiction that federal courts may exercise." 49 Cal.2d at 348, 316 P.2d
at 966.
91 433 U.S. at 211-12; see, e.g., Smit, supra note 42, at 612.
92 433 U.S. at 196; see Smit, supra note 42, at 614; Zammit, supra note 35, at 675-76;
Comment, supra note 23, at 338.
93 433 U.S. at 205-07; see, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 312-13 (1950) (state adjudicatory power viewed apart from in personam, in rem, and quasi
in rem terminology); U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142, 154 (3d Cir. 1976) (whether
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property is actually a proceeding against the owner of the property. 94 The Court concluded that the due process requirement of
minimum contacts, which applies to the exercise of jurisdiction over
persons, should therefore apply to the exercise of jurisdiction over
the res. 95
This rationale entailed a rejection of Harris v. Balk insofar as
Harris permitted the attachment of property as a basis for a valid
quasi in rem judgment against the owner, where the property was
not related to the claim sued on, and the owner had no contact with
the forum. 9 6 The Court declared, however, that in most cases where
the action is brought to secure a claim in the property or to recover
damages for injuries suffered on the property, the property alone
would serve as the basis for jurisdiction without the existence of other
contacts. 9 7 In cases where, the Court reasoned, a nonresident property owner "expected to benefit from the State's protection of his
interest," it is fair and reasonable to require him to appear in a suit
which directly involves the property or the rights and obligations that
arise from the ownership of it. 98 Because Delaware's attempted
exercise of jurisdiction under the sequestration statute failed to comply with this standard, it was declared unconstitutional. 9 9
Applying its ruling on abstract principles to the facts before it,
the Court first determined that the statutory presence of the stock
could not provide a basis for jurisdiction because it was wholly unrelated to the claim sued on. 10 0 The Court further determined that the
designation be in personam, in rem or quasi in rem, "ultimately the test of InternationalShoe is
determinative"); Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677-79 (1965) (assignment of situs to intangibles for jurisdictional purposes proved unworkable in escheat case); Jonnet v. Dollar Say.
Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1132 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (territorial basis of jurisdiction "stretched to improbable configurations" by use of fictions).
" 433 U.S. at 207; see e.g., Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812,
appeal dismissed, 174 U.S. 405 (1900); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 139 (1971).

95 433 U.S. at 212.
9 Id. at 208-12, 211 n.38, 212 n.39; see U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142, 154-55
(3d Cir. 1976). Compare Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 207-08 with Texas v. New Jersey, 379
U.S. 674, 678-79 (1965).
97 433 U.S. at 207; see id. at 199 n.17, 207 n.24. The Court also acknowledged these examples were not inclusive, but that other factors not mentioned by the court may be considered.
Id. at 208 n.28. On this point Justice Powell said he would reserve judgment on whether
certain kinds of property with fixed situs might alone provide a basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 217
(Powell, J., concurring).
98 Id. at 207-08.
99 See id. at 213-17. The Court of Chancery of Delaware has recognized the continued
validity of Delaware's sequestration statute where minimum contacts exist. Grynberg v. Burke,
388 A.2d 443, 445 (Del. Ch. 1978).
100 Id. at 213; see U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 1976).
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presence of stock did not indicate other contacts sufficient to justify
jurisdiction; the defendants had never entered the State of Delaware,
as Greyhound had its principle place of business outside the state,
and none of the acts relating to the cause of action had occurred
within the state. 1 0 ' Heitner, however, argued that the defendants'
positions as fiduciaries of a Delaware corporation provided minimum
contacts by reason of the state's interest "in supervising the management of a Delaware corporation." 102 Moreover, he continued, the
defendants had obtained the "benefits and protection" of Delaware
law when they accepted their fiduciary roles in a Delaware corpora03
tion and, therefore, should be amenable to the state's jurisdiction. 1
As to Heitner's first argument, the Court replied that it was undermined by Delaware's failure "to assert the state interest" in controlling the conduct of nonresident fiduciaries in its sequestration
statute; this statute was premised upon the presence of property and
could be used against a nonresident in any type of suit.' 0 4 Although
Delaware might have assured its jurisdiction over nonresident corporate fiduciaries by requiring them to purchase stock in their corporations if it had had an interest in controlling their conduct, the state
failed to do so. 10 5 Nevertheless, the Court noted that even if such
an interest had been articulated by the state and recognized by the
Court, it would not have been a determinative factor.' 0 6 Although
1o

433 U.S. at 213.
Id. at 213-14. With respect to this argument, one commentator has remarked that "a
substantial interest in regulating the underlying controversy under its own law" may support
jurisdiction in the state, von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 53, at 1129-35. It has also been
noted that "because of the expanding scope of jurisdiction, the state of incorporation need no
longer be accepted blindly as a place where the corporation may be sued." Developments in the
Law, supra note 64, at 933.
103 433 U.S. at 215-16; see 326 U.S. at 319.
104 433 U.S. at 214. The Court recognized, however, that the sequestration statute may have
been used "most frequently" against nonresident fiduciaries of Delaware corporations. Id. In
fact, the unchallenged availability of the statute for use in obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident fiduciaries may have obviated the need for the state's assertion of an interest in controlling
nonresident fiduciaries of its corporations. Id. at 191 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See generally Hughes Tool Co. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 290 A.2d 693,
695 (Del. Ch. 1972).
105See 433 U.S. at 214-15.
106 Id. Courts are looking more at the local contacts between a foreign corporation and the
state in which it carries on business rather than focusing solely on the state of incorporation in
order to determine which policy interest should govern. See, e.g., Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961). For a discussion of Western Air Lines
and the states' growing concern with the internal affairs of foreign corporations, see Reese &
Kaufman, The Law Governing CorporateAffairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith
and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1958).
The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws notes that the "court will exercise jurisdiction over
an action involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation unless it is an inappropriate or
102
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the policy interest of the state would have been relevant to the choice
of law question, without more it did not prove Delaware a "fair
forum." 107

In response to the plaintiff's second argument, the Court replied
that Heitner had failed to show that the defendants, by accepting
their fiduciary roles, had purposefully enjoyed the benefits from their
affiliation with Delaware. 10 Nor had the defendants expected to be
haled before a Delaware tribunal absent a statute equating the acceptance of a fiduciary position with an implied consent to jurisdiction. 10 9 This concern for putting a nonresident on notice of his
amenability to a foreign jurisdiction was reiterated in Justice Steven's
concurring opinion. 110
Justice Brennan, while agreeing with the majority's reformulation
of constitutional doctrine, disagreed vigorously with the outcome."'
He maintained that as a general rule a state should have jurisdiction
to hear a stockholder's derivative suit against nonresident fiduciaries
of its corporations. 11 2 The critical factor in his mind was the defendants' affiliation with the forum, through their fiduciary relationship
with Greyhound. In Justice Brennan's opinion, the defendants were
accorded the benefit and protection of Delaware law as officers and
directors of the corporation, and therefore, should have been responinconvenient forum for the trial of the action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 313 (1971). Generally,
when the corporation is only technically a foreign corporation, since all, or the great
majority, of its contacts, other than the place of its incorporation, are in the state of
the forum, the courts will even entertain actions which call for relief affecting the
corporation's organic structure or internal administration.
Id. § 313, Comment c, at 348.
Arizona, Greyhound's principle place of business, may also have a legitimate state interest
in hearing the dispute and in applying its own law. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); State ex rel. Wurdman v. Reynolds, 275 Mo. 113, 204
S.W. 1093 (1918) (en banc); Latty, Psuedo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955). See
generally R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS 26-70 (1976).
107 433 U.S. at 215; see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958). Compare Babcock v.

Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 479-82, 191 N.E.2d 279, 282-83, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747-49 (1963) (the
state having the most significant contacts with the controversy, i.e., forming the "center of
gravity" of the controversy should have its laws applied) with Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at
254 (contacts which may be sufficient to support application of the law of a particular state may

be insufficient to support jurisdiction).
108 433 U.S. at 215-16. The majority indicated that the defendants "simply had nothing to do
with the State of Delaware." Id. The Court's conclusion as to the absence of purposeful availment may be construed by lower courts as constituting dictum. See generally L. Bucki & Son
Lumber Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 109 F. 393, 400 (5th Cir. 1901).
109 433 U.S. at 216.

110 Id. at 218.
11 See id. at 219-22. See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 53, at 1124-34.
112 433 U.S. at 222.
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13
sible for answering suits arising out of their fiduciary capacity.1
Furthermore, he believed that the defendants' breach of duty outside
the state and the foreseeable effect of that act upon a Delaware
jurisdiction even though
corporation were sufficient acts to warrant
4
forum."
the
the acts occurred outside
Because a derivative suit is brought on behalf of the corporation,
Justice Brennan contended that "the chartering State has an unusually powerful interest in insuring the availability of a convenient
forum" in such a suit. 11 5 He pointed out three public policy interests involved, namely, the state's interest in: (1) vindicating the rights
of its corporations; (2) providing a convenient tribunal to oversee their
116
internal affairs: and (3) implementing state regulatory schemes.
Recognizing that the majority relegated these interests to choice of
law issues, he advised not to "compartmentalize thinking in this
area." 117 In fact, he advocated a closer relationship between jurisdictional and choice of law inquiries, noting that both inquiries often
involve similar considerations such as the expectations of the parties
and notions of fairness. 118 At the very least, he argued, decisions

113 Id. at 227-28. Justice Brennan found that the defendants had

voluntarily associated themselves with the State of Delaware, "invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws" by entering into a long term and fragile relationship
with one of its domestic corporations. They thereby elected to assume powers and
to undertake responsibilities wholly derived from that State's rules and regulations,
and to become eligible for those benefits that Delaware law makes available to its
corporations' officials.
Id. (citations omitted).
For an application of the purposeful availment doctrine, see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253 (1958).
114

433 U.S. at 226.

at 222.
116 Id. at 223. But see Comment, Law For Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law
of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 894-98 (1969) (Delaware prefers less restrictive statutory
control over its corporations to ensure the state's continued attractiveness as a place of incorporation).
"1 433 U.S. at 224-25.
118Id. Merging choice of law and jurisdictional considerations would allow the forum to apply
its own laws in many instances. Id. Compare 433 U.S. at 223-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) with Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1140-42 (3d Cir.
1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring). As a result, a state with a competing interest would be
excluded from either hearing the dispute or having its laws applied. Thus, if an analytical approach which attempts to synthesize jurisdictional and choice of law considerations is to be
adopted, then it seems that one must ask whether Delaware's interest in hearing the dispute,
and thereby excluding other states from doing the same, is sufficient to satisfy the demands of
federalism and prevent encroachment upon the sovereignty of a sister state. Only by inquiring
into another state's competing interest in hearing the dispute can this question be answered.
Judge Gibbons articulated this kind of an approach in Jonnet, 530 F.2d at 1140, and in
Empire Abrasive Equip. Corp. v. H.H. Watson, Inc., 567 F.2d 554, 557-58 (3d Cir. 1977). In
both these cases, Judge Gibbons suggested a dual inquiry for determining the proper scope of
115Id.
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about what law to apply are relevant to determining the fairness of
utilizing a given jurisdiction, and a bridge between the two issues would "minimize conflicts, confusion, and uncertainty." 119
Much of the majority's statement on the issue of whether
minimum contacts existed between the chartering state and the nonresident fiduciaries of one of its corporations is less than clear and
convincing. Yet it appears that the Court was primarily concerned
with notice to the fiduciaries of their amenability to the jurisdiction of
a foreign state.' 2 0 This would seem to explain why the Court failed
to find minimum contacts while at the same time it appeared to give
tacit approval to implied consent statutes directed at nonresident
fiduciaries, and hence, suggested that the existence of such a statute
would then have made the exercise of jurisdiction fair even where, as
here, it failed to find a sufficient nexus for jurisdiction.' 2 1 Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand why the majority did not recognize a manifest interest on the part of a chartering state in controlling the conduct of nonresident fiduciaries of its corporations, and
consider this interest as a significant factor in resolving a jurisdictional
issue. 122 It is also hard to imagine how the defendants could not
have purposefully availed themselves of the benefits accruing from
Delaware law, as the Court suggests, by reason of their positions in a
Delaware corporation. 12 3 Despite these ambiguities, however, the
most significant questions raised by Shaffer concern subsequent judicial analysis and the continued viability of quasi in rem jurisdiction in
light of the Court's articulation of new constitutional doctrine.

jurisdiction. First, it would be necessary to determine whether there is sufficient state interest
to justify the exercise of state sovereignty to the exclusion of another state. Second, if the forum
has the requisite interest, then it must be determined whether it would be fair to the defendant
to subject it to jurisdiction. This latter determination involves an examination of the legitimate
expectations of the parties.
119 433 U.S. at 226.
120 Id. at 214-16. Cf. Empire Abrasive Equip. Corp. v. H.H. Watson, Inc., 567 F.2d 554,
558 (3d Cir. 1977) (question of whether it is fair to compel a nonresident to defend a suit in a
foreign state must be answered "by reference to the expectations of the parties to the transaction" that gives rise to the litigation).
121 See 433 U.S. at 216. In response to the Shaffer decision the Delaware Legislature
enacted an implied consent statute aimed at fiduciaries of Delaware corporations. The statute
subjects them to the court's personal jurisdiction in derivative suits. See DEL. CODE tit. 10, §
3114 (1977). For a recent examination of this statute, see Jacobs & Stargatt, The New Delaware
Director-Consent-to-Service Statute, 33 Bus. LAW. 701 (1978). The question then raised is
whether an implied consent statute could be upheld where there are no minimum contacts.
This issue, however, may be largely conceptualistic and easily resolved by a factual finding of
minimum contacts.
122 See 433 U.S. at 214-15.
121 See id. at 227-28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Judicial inquiry into the propriety of an exercise of quasi in rem
jurisdiction will, henceforth, be a two-fold process. Courts must first
ask whether the attached property is related to the litigation in such a
way as to provide a nexus for jurisdiction, and if not, whether the
property considered along with all the other contacts that exist between defendant, forum, and litigation make the exercise of jurisdiction fair and reasonable. 1 24 The Shaffer Court enumerated
several situations where property alone would serve as a basis for
jurisdiction. For example, jurisdiction would exist where the suit was
brought to secure a claim in the attached property or to recover damages for injury suffered on the attached land. 125 But the Court did
not intend these illustrations to be exclusive or determinative of
124 Id. at 209; see Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017, 1022 (2d Cir.
1978).
Given the particular facts of Shaffer, however, the Court could have adopted an alternative
analysis that would have comported with fairness and reasonableness. At the very hart of the
Shaffer decision lies a constitutional prohibition against the use of quasi in rem power to acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who has no minimum contacts with the forum.
See O'Conner v. Lee-Hy Paving, 437 F. Supp. 994, 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). Accordingly,
whenever a state attempts to adjudicate a personal claim against a nonresident and award a
judgment against him personally, it must'have minimum contacts with that party whether its
judicial power is predicated on service of process or the situs of property. But whenever a state
attempts to exercise adjudicatory power to litigate a claim or right in property itself, reliance on
its sovereign power over property within its borders would appear, under a standard of fairness
and reasonableness, to justify jurisdiction. Under this approach to the jurisdictional issue, a court
would be reqpired to determine whether the suit, apart from jurisdictional nomenclature, is
directed primarily against the defendant. If so, then the minimum contacts test must be met. If,
on the other hand, the claim were to the property or a right in the property, the court's
sovereign power over the res and its interest in resolving disputes over conflicting claims to
such property would allow it to adjudicate the claim, regardless of whether minimum contacts
existed. In this way, truly quasi in rem actions-defined as suits to affect the interests of
particular persons in designated property by attempting to secure a claim in the property and
extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular parties, RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS § 8 (1942)-are unaffected by Shaffer, while actions unrelated to attached property and brought primarily to satisfy a claim against the owner would be within the ambit of the
minimum contacts test. Still, a third type of action would remain. Such an action would be
brought to satisfy a claim against the defendant, but would be connected to the property within
the forum state, as, for example, with a tort occurring upon land. Within this latter category,
courts could view the action as personal, yet give greater weight to the existence of the related
property as a connection between the defendant and the forum state which would justify the
exercise of personal jurisdiction.
This type of analysis entails reading the Shaffer decision as a limitation upon a state's
attempt to compel the personal appearance of nonresidents before its tribunals, but preserves
the concept of sovereign control over property within the territorial borders of the state. See
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring). One advantage of this approach is
that it redefines the scope of a court's quasi in rem jurisdiction, while it clearly and unambiguously articulates and recognizes the state's peculiar interest and control over property located
within its boundaries.
125 433 U.S. at 207-08.
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jurisdiction in all cases. 126 Thus, the issue ultimately turns upon
whether the cause of action arises out of, or seeks to resolve an issue
pertinent to, the rights and obligations of ownership over which the
state extends a canopy of expected protection. For instance, the defendant's land within the forum may provide a basis for quasi in rem
jurisdiction in litigating the owner's rights and obligations arising out
of a tort which allegedly occurred on that land. 1 2 7 Given this
rationale, it is the benefit which the owner receives from the state's
protection of those rights incidental to ownership, and the state's interest
in enforcing the obligations arising out of that ownership, which are
the crucial factors governing the jurisdictional question. The nature of
this relationship between the nonresident owner and the state, along
with the presence of property in the forum, would appear to justify
burdening the owner with defending in a foreign state, but only when
the action involves rights and obligations incidental to the ownership
of that property.
The second part of this two-fold inquiry into quasi in rem jurisdiction turns upon minimum contacts analysis. It raises the question
of what kind of minimum contacts analysis will be undertaken, what
factors will be considered, and how, if at all, will this inquiry differ
from an in personam analysis. 12 8 Perhaps a wider or more expansive
analysis may be required-one that will encompass a broader scope
of factors in order to determine whether there are contacts which
make the exercise of jurisdiction consonant with " 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.' "129 For instance, it would appear appropriate for the relative situation of all the parties to the suit
and their respective interests to be considerations of growing importance. ' 3 0 The courts must also focus on the competing interests of the
at 208 n.28.
127 Id. at 208.
128 Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 956.
126 Id.

129 See Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 150-51, 545 P.2d 264, 268, 127 Cal. Rptr.
352, 356 (1976) (where the "justification for the exercise of jurisdiction is not obvious, the con-

venience of the parties is a factor to be considered"); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 I11.2d 432, 440, 176 N.E.2d 761, 765 (1961) (the issue "cannot be answered
by applying a mechanical formula or rule of thumb but by ascertaining what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances"); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 573-74, 80
A.2d 664, 666-67 (1951).
1"0 See, e.g., Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at

637; O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 997-1004 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 47
U.S.L.W. 2007 (2d Cir. June 12, 1978). The court of appeals stated:
The overriding teaching of Shaffer is that courts must look at realities and not
be led astray by fictions. Viewed realistically, the insurer in a case such as this is in

full control of the litigation: it selects the attorneys, it decides if and when to settle,
and it makes all procedural decisions in connection with the litigation. Moreover, a

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:47

parties and the actual burden associated with defending in a foreign
state.'31 This approach should give recognition to the interests of the
forum state, although the forum's interest alone does not make the
exercise of jurisdiction fair.' 3 2 Thus, the question of whether the
defendant's contacts with the forum subject him to its jurisdiction
must be determined by weighing the competing interests involved
133
and assessing the true burdens of litigation.
More importantly, however, the Shaffer opinion raises a serious
question about the continued use of quasi in rem attachment in those
states which permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full
extent allowed under the constitution, that is, whenever there are
minimum contacts. 1 34 Since due process will now require minimum
judgment in a Seider type case does not deprive the defendant of money; the full
force of the judgment rests on the insurer.
Id. at 2007. Moreover, Judge Friendly emphasized that the court was not aware of any instance
of unfairness resulting from the application of the Seider rule since its inception in 1966. Id.
31 See Developments in the Law, supra note 64, at 957-58, 965-66.
132 See 433 U.S. at 215.
133 See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 997-1004 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
aff'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 2007 (2d Cir. June 12, 1978); Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d at 114-15, 216
N.E.2d at 314-15, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102; Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d
at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637; Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d at 347, 316 P.2d at 966.
134 E.g., N.J.R. 4:4-4(c)(1), -(4)(e); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-5-33. For cases construing the
minimum contacts doctrine under New Jersey's long-arm statute, see Cooke v. Yarrington, 62
N.J. 123, 128-29, 299 A.2d 400, 403 (1973) (personal jurisdiction acquired over a former resident
of New Jersey, who was involved in an automobile accident in Pennsylvania, at a time when he
was a resident of New Jersey driving under a New Jersey license and in a car registered in New
Jersey, and who, after leaving the forum state, occasionally visited parents residing there);
Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 272-73, 277 A.2d 207, 211-12 (1971) (court found sufficient contacts to support jurisdiction over New York defendant who purchased goods from New
Jersey manufacturer, where defendant had been in New Jersey only once in connection with
transaction and contacts had been by mail, telephone, and visits by plaintiffs' representatives to
New York); Egan v. Fieldhouse, 139 N.J. Super. 220, 224-25, 353 A.2d 148, 150 (Law Div.
1976) (jurisdiction upheld in personal injury suit by purchasers of New Jersey residence alleging
defective construction by the seller-builder after he had left the state); Blessing v. Prosser, 141
N.J. Super. 548, 550-51, 359 A.2d 493, 493-94 (App. Div. 1976) (advertising by hotel in AAA
guide distributed in New Jersey constituted minimum contacts); Trustees Structural Steel v.
Huber, 136 N.J. Super. 501, 506, 347 A.2d 10, 12-13 (App. Div. 1975), certif denied, 70 N.J.
143, 358 A.2d 190 (1976) (minimum contacts found in embezzlement action against nonresident
defendant based on agreements entered into between New Jersey labor unions and foreign
corporation of which defendant was president); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Katzmann, 137 N.J.
Super. 106, 107-09, 348 A.2d 193, 194 (App. Div. 1975) (minimum contacts found in action
based upon a debt contracted by a nonresident in New Jersey while he was a New Jersey
resident jointly with another New Jersey resident and involving New Jersey real estate which
defendant owned); Govan v. Trade Bank & Trust Co., 109 N.J. Super. 271, 275, 263 A.2d 146,
148 (App. Div. 1970) (urisdiction upheld in an action brought by nonresident plaintiff against
nonresident defendant on a promissory note negotiated, executed, and payable in New Jersey,
where New Jersey was only state having a substantial connection with the transaction); Knight
v. San Jacinto Club, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 81, 90, 232 A.2d 462, 467 (Law Div. 1967) (state has
jurisdiction over nonresident with respect to an act committed by him while visiting this state).
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contacts as a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction, in personam
jurisdiction will be available as an alternative to quasi in rem jurisdiction in these states.1 35 In such a situation, the propriety of quasi
in rem attachment will have to be determined on two levels-state
and federal. On the first level, the courts must ask whether state
policy permits the attachment of a nonresident's property to acquire
jurisdiction when the owner is amenable to service of process. In
some states where attachment is viewed as an extraordinary proceeding, the courts have held that the use of this proceeding to attach
property of a nonresident who could have been served with process is
inconsistent with the designs of the attachment statute.1 36 Thus, a
writ of attachment will not issue unless it can be justified upon other
137
than jurisdictional grounds.
For a further discussion of the leading United States Supreme Court decisions construing the
minimum contacts doctrine, see note 19 supra.
In those jurisdictions where the state legislature has limited the personal jurisdiction of its
court to specifically enumerated actions, quasi in rem jurisdiction, and hence attachment, will
remain a necessary complement to the court's in personam power. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LAw § 302 (McKinney's Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
'31 See 433 U.S. at 212.
136 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:26-2 (West 1952); Lance Indus., Inc. v. Eastern Specialties

Co., 107 N.J. Super. 296, 300-01, 258 A.2d 146, 148 (Ch. Div. 1969) (in most cases where
there is an absence of fraud, attachment will lie only where the debtor's property is within the
state but the debtor himself is beyond the court's in personam jurisdiction); Augustus Co. ex.
rel. Bourgeois ,. Manzella, 19 N.J. Misc. 29, 30, 17 A.2d 68, 69 (Atlantic County Ct. 1940)
(writ of attachment is an extraordinary writ which should not be used when the debtor is subject to ordinary service of process).
'37 For example, under New Jersey's prejudgment attachment statute, attachment is available
to both residents and nonresidents as a prejudgment security device upon several grounds.
Where, for instance, the plaintiff would be entitled to an order of arrest before judgment in a
civil action, the court may issue a writ of attachment. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:26-2(a) (West 1952).
The right to an order of arrest exists in tort actions where the suit is "founded upon (a) an
outrageous battery or a mayhem, (b) a claim of damages for the misconduct or neglect of a
public officer or (c) a willful or malicious act and the defendant is a nonresident or is about to
remove from the state." Id.§ 2A:15-41. In contract actions the writ of attachment will issue
where the "defendant is about to remove any of his property out of the jurisdiction of the
court... with intent to defraud his creditors;" or where the defendant "fraudulently conceals"
any of his property; or where he has or is about to transfer property "with intent to defraud his
creditors;" or where the debt or demand being sued on was "fraudulently contracted." Id. §§
2A:15-42, :26-2. Secondly, attachment may lie where a plaintiff has a legal or equitable claim
against a defendant who absconds with the intent of defeating the demands of his creditors. Id. §
2A:26-2(b),(d). Thirdly, property may be seized where the plaintiff seeks a judgment in rem
against the property of a decedent. Id. § 2A:26-2(c). Lastly, where the defendant is a foreign
corporation authorized to do business in New Jersey, and the state of incorporation permits
attachment against New Jersey corporations authorized to do business there, attachment may
issue. Id. § 2A:26-2(e). The legitimacy of this latter ground will depend on the particular circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Carolina Power & light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044
(N.D. Cal. 1977). For a discussion of the New Jersey attachment statute, see 11 RuTGERs L.
REV. 714 (1957).
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If the writ of attachment is issued, however, it will have to be
further justified on a constitutional level. Due process has been interpreted to demand notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to
the seizure of property. Although these procedural safeguards are not
always possible, as for instance, prior to quasi in rem attachment,
they may be suspended only under extraordinary circumstances. 1 38
Where in personam jurisdiction is an available alternative to quasi in
rem jurisdiction, attachment may no longer be characterized as an
extraordinary measure necessary for proceeding against nonresidents.
Thus, the seizure of a nonresident's property may be unconstitutional
unless it can be rationalized as an extraordinary measure and as a
prejudgment security device. Moreover, since the fill faith and credit
clause demands the enforcement of valid personal judgments in all
states, attachment of a nonresident's property without proper justification may constitute a discriminatory practice against nonresidents,
and hence violate the equal protection clause. 139
Thus, Shaffer marks the second major step, begun by International Shoe, in the movement away from a territorial concept of adjudicatory power to one of fundamental fairness. It heralds an important era in the judicial evolution of jurisdictional due process. In a
very real sense it is the slow but direct response to the demands of a
federal system, and hence the product of a dialectic development: the
state's inclination to expand its jurisdiction versus the need for limitations to prevent unfairness and to protect the sovereign integrity
common to all states. The synthesis of these two influences has resulted in a "minimum contacts" test based on fairness. Such a standard has provided reasonable expectations as to the outcome while
complying with a sense of fairness and justice. This standard, however, is a flexible and evolving doctrine which may itself further develop as the Court attempts to fairly balance all the competing interests in our present judicial structure.
John G. Fellinger
s For a discussion of the procedural guarantees of due process, see note 12 supra. However, the Shaffer court did not.question the validity of attachment of property owned by an
absconding debtor. 433 U.S.at 210; see Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp.
1044, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
139See Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1142 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring).

